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THE STEALTH AMENDMENT: THE IMPENDING




We got lucky last time. Nonetheless, the danger remains that the next consti-
tutional amendment will cause the same surprise as did the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment. When the Twenty-Seventh Amendment completed its stealth ratifi-
cation 202 years after proposal, many in Congress quickly checked to see whether
any other hidden constitutional time bombs lurked.' Just as the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment's stealth arose out of its too-slow-to-be-noticed ratification, so too an
amendment to balance the federal budget seems to be sneaking into the Constitu-
tion because its progress continues to go largely unnoticed amid good economic
times.2 The good news about the national debt explains the lack of attention to the
Budget Amendment, but cannot prevent its ratification and subsequent repeal once
the economic conditions inevitably worsen.
The rules making the ratification and repeal of a Budget Amendment certain
arise out of federal officials' practices, rather than out of the text of the Constitu-
tion.3 As things now stand, considerations of personal political cost and timing of
elections can have a larger effect on whether an amendment is adopted than
considerations of constitutionality because Congress continues its practice of
"promulgating amendments." Moreover, the Supreme Court's continued absten-
tion on federal amending process issues cedes a plenary power over the process
that conflicts with notions of federal-state comity inhering in the Constitution's
design. If the rules do not change, we will have a Budget Amendment as part of
the Constitution, but only for a while. If the rules do change, they do so in conflict
with James Madison's expectation that the rules of the amending process should
be clear and unchanging even while channeling the process of change. Ultimately,
t. Appellatespecialistcertifiedby State Bar ofCalifornia Board ofLegal Specialization. This article is dedicated
to Stephen and Robyn.
1. See RICHARD B. BERNmEN & JEROME A-EL, AMENDING AMERIcA, IF W LovE THE CoNsr. oN So MUCH
WHYDoWEKEEPTRYINGToCHANGEI? 301-07 (1993).
2. See, e.g., Richard W. Stevenson, Clinton and G.O.P. Brace for Budget Battle, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 1998),
at p. Al (noting "projections showing that the federal budget surpluses will be even bigger than Congress had
expected").
3. James Madison presciently called for consideration ofamending process rules on grounds that the requirements
were left too vague. See 2 THERECORDS OFTiEDEBAiES INTHECONVENIONOF 1787, at 558 (Max Farrand ed., Rev.
Ed. 1966) [hereinafter FARIAND, RECORDS].
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"rules" of the amending process born of political expediency and judicial absten-
tion can powerfully undermine the constitutional precepts upon which this nation
should rest securely.
The cumulative effect of Congress and the Court's answers to questions not
addressed in the Constitution itself should serve us with notice of the Budget
Amendment's impending ratification and subsequent repeal. A whole host of rules
now attend the laconic guidance of Article V. Some clearly comport with the con-
stitutional text.4 Some rules resolve an ambiguity in the text.5 Some rules have
been fashioned out of whole cloth.6 This Article anticipates and assesses the dam-
age of the next surprise amendment with which non-constitutional rules of amend-
ment will surprise us.
II. CONGRESS PROPOSES AN AMENDMENT TO BALANCE THE FEDERAL BUDGET
Throughout this nation's history, many have criticized the federal deficit
spending allowed by Congress's constitutionally unconstrained power to borrow.
7
In 1798, Thomas Jefferson suggested "taking from the federal government the
power of borrowing" by amending the Constitution.8 In 1824, Andrew Jackson
characterized the federal debt as "a national curse" during his campaign for the
presidency.9 Today too, the national debt appears to be a national curse. In exer-
cising unconstrained borrowing power, the United States has amassed an esti-
mated $5,207,000,000,000 in federal debt by the end of 1996.1" The American
electorate now favors "by a large margin" a constitutional amendment to require
balancing of the federal budget.1 Moreover, "[t]here is now a consensus in Wash-
ington that the country must do something about the deficit."' 2 Although the idea
of an amendment to balance the federal budget is coeval with the Constitution, no
4. Presidents, for example; have no official role in the amending process because they are not at all mentioned in
Article V. See Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378,382 (1798).
5. For example, the "two-thirds of both Houses" of Congress needed to propose and amendment has been
interpreted to mean two-thirds of a quorum of each house, rather than two-thirds of members of Congress as a whole.
See Rhode Island v. Palmer (National Prohibition Cases), 253 U.S. 350,386 (1920) ("The two-thirds vote in each
house which is required in proposing an amendment is a vote of two thirds of the members present 'assuming the
presence of a quorum' and not a vote of two thirds of the entire membership, present and absent").
6. A state may not rescind its earlier ratification of an amendment even though a state may ratify an amendment
that it earlier rejected. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433,448-50 (1939) (affirming Congress's counting of Ohio
and New Jersey's ratifications of the Fourteenth Amendment, despite the states' subsequent attempts to rescind their
earlier approvals). ButseeBrendonTroyIshikawa, Everything YouAlways Wantedto KnowAboutHowAmendments
Are Made, But Were Afraid to Ask, 24 HAsTiNGs CoNsT. L.Q. 545, 557-70 (1997).
7. The Constitution does not qualify Congress's power "to borrow money on the credit of the United States". U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2 (capitalization omitted).
8. JAMES D. SAVAGE, BALANCED BUDGEmS AND AMEiCAN PoLrIcs 106 (1988).
9. JOHNSTEELEGORDON, HAMILTON'SBLEsslNG: THEEXTRAORDINARYLIEEANDTIMES OFOuRNATONAL DEBT
59 (1997). In 1824, the total national debt totaled $84 million. At the time Jackson made his pledge to eradicate the
national debt, it had actually been falling from its high of $127 million a decade earlier. 2 U.S. DF"TOF COMMERCE,
HISORICALSTATISTnCS OFThMUNriED STAIS: COLONIAL TIMES 1O1970, at 1104 (1975).
10. BUREAUOFThECENsus,U.S.DEP'TOFCOMMERCESTATIScALABSTRACrOFTHEUNITEDSTATES 1996,at330.
11. David E. Rosenbaum, G.O.P., Playing Doubtful Hand, Delays a Balanced-Budget Vote: Fate of Proposed
Amendment Appears Uncertain, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1997, at Al.
12. John Steele Gordon, Editorial, Our Debt to Hamilton, WALL ST. J., March 12, 1997, at Al8.
[Vol. 35:353
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measure has yet secured the requisite congressional votes or state calls needed for
proposal. Recently, the Budget Amendment failed by a single vote in the Senate.13
As a result, some now consider the issue temporarily "dead."' 4 A confluence of
congressionally created rules and supreme court doctrine, however, will keep the
issue alive.
A. The Rule of Congressional Preemption
During most of the Philadelphia convention, the plan for amending the Con-
stitution allowed only states to initiate the amending process. Not until the end of
the convention did Alexander Hamilton rise to suggest that Congress too be given
the power to propose amendments. "There could be no danger in giving this
power ," he asserted "as the people would finally decide in the case.""i Hamilton
thus referred to the requirement that three-quarters of the states ratify an amend-
ment, which would prevent Congress from controlling the outcome of the amend-
ing process. And yet, in the power to start the amending process lies Congress's
power to significantly affect, if not determine, the end result.
Despite the availability of two procedures for drafting constitutional amend-
ments, every one of the thirty-three proposed amendments has been drafted by
Congress. 6 Congress may propose an amendment "whenever two thirds of both
Houses shall deem it necessary". The second procedure, in which two-thirds of
the states call for an amendment, has not been ignored even though it has not yet
achieved a constitutional convention. On at least two occasions this second proce-
dure has verged upon success. The first occasion concerned the quest to allow
popular election of United States Senators.
Before the Seventeenth Amendment's proposal and ratification, numerous
states bound their legislative selection of their United States Senators to the out-
come of popular state-wide elections. 7 Americans overwhelmingly supported a
federal amendment to allow for popular election of United States Senators. None-
theless, such an amendment repeatedly failed to pass the Senate despite repeated
successful passage in the House of Representatives. Senators who owed their
terms in office to personal relationships with their state legislators remained loath
to embrace the system of popular election. Self-interest and inertia long thwarted
proposals for the amendment in the Senate.
13. See Naftali Benavid, Amendment Fever Outbreak Worsening, S.F. EXAMINER, June 22, 1997, atA10. See
generally E. Donald Elliot, Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit, 1985 DuKEL.J. 1077 (discussing sustained
efforts to convene a constitutional convention for purposes of drafting and proposing a Budget Amendment).
14. See, e.g., David E. Rosenbaum, Republicans'BudgetAmendment is Headedfor Defeat in the Senate, N.Y.
TIms, Feb. 27, 1997, at Al.
15. 2 FARPAm, RECORDS, at 558.
16. See BENSTEIN&AGEL, supra note 1, at pp. 301-07.
17. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators of each
State, chosen by the Legislature thereof... "); see also Roger G. Brooks, Garcia, The Seventeenth Amendment, and
the Role of the Supreme Court in Defending Federalism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLICY 189, 207-208 (1987)
(discussing design of direct primaries and "Oregon system" in attempting to secure popular election of United States
Senators prior to Seventeenth Amendment).
2000]
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Yet, when nearly two-thirds of the states had called for a constitutional con-
vention to bypass Congress in drafting the amendment, the Senate reluctantly pro-
posed what became the Seventeenth Amendment. Senators realized that if they did
not write the amendment themselves, it would be drafted for them."8 Rather than
risk the uncertainty of an amending convention -- the outcome of which might to
revise more than just the method of election -- Senators sought to constrain the
extent of a constitutional reform by writing it themselves. For example, the
Senate-approved amendment provided that upon ratification, Senators could com-
plete their terms regardless of whether they had been popularly elected or selected
by state legislature.19 Thus, the prerogative to draft amendments allowed members
of Congress to avert a convention that might have changed the nature of their of-
fices. Congressional preemption of a convention allows Congress to lessen the
impact of popularly called-for constitutional reforms.20
The second instance of a constitutional reform nearly achieving the requisite
number of state calls for a convention involves the ongoing movement for an
amendment to ensure a balanced federal budget. To date, thirty-two of the requi-
site thirty-five states have called for a convention to draft the Budget Amend-
ment.21 Such an amendment would impose borrowing, spending, and taxation
constraints on Congress in passing the federal budget. As with the Seventeenth
Amendment, numerous congressionally originated proposals have failed to secure
the necessary two-thirds majority of Congress required by Article V. Not surpris-
ingly, amendments that would limit congressional powers face seemingly insupera-
ble opposition from Congress itself. But the prospect of an imminent convention
can be expected to prompt Congress to preempt the convention by itself proposing
the amendment. With the Budget Amendment, Congress seems likely to draft the
amendment to allow itself significant flexibility. Versions of the Budget Amend-
ment that have reached floor votes in Congress would allow the amendment's con-
straints to be waived in any year by a three-fifths vote of Congress. Also, these
congressionally drafted versions have lacked any kind of enforcement mecha-
nism.21 Were Congress to allow a convention to draft the amendment, neither the
three-fifths waiver provision nor lax enforceability could be relied upon to find
their way into the proposed amendment's text.
18. See William Van Alstyne, Notes on a Bicentennial Constitution: Part I, Processes of Change, 1984 U. Iu-
L. REv. 933, 943; see also Kris W. Kobach, Note, Rethinking Article V. Term Limits and the Seventeenth
Amendment, 103 YALELJ. 1971,1979 n.36 (1994). One commentator describes the situation in which state calls for
a convention nearly achieve the constitutional requisite as the "Politicians Dilemma," which "may stimulate Congress
to act... even though ideally individual members might prefer to keep existing institutional amendments." Elliot,
supra note 13, at 1103-04.
19. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XVII, § I ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each
state, elected by the people thereof').
20. Thus, it may be said that "there are good reasons to believe that measures that emerge from a Congress prodded
into action by the threat of a convention may not be as desirable as the reforms that would be suggested by a
convention." Elliot, supra note 13, at 1103-04.
21. See id at 1078.
22. See Gay Aynesworth Crostwait, Note, Article III Problems in Enforcing the Balanced Budget Amendment,
83 COLUM. L. REv. 1065, 1068-71 (1983).
[Vol. 35:353356
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With thirty-two of the thirty-five states necessary for a convention having
issued calls, Congress seems to sense the "need" to avoid a convention. Possibly
with thirty-three states, and surely with thirty-four, the dwindling opportunity to
mitigate the effect of an amendment to constrain Congress members' legislative
powers can be expected to result in Congress proposing the amendment to the
states.
A casual reading of Article V, with its dual procedures for proposing amend-
ments, does not seem to foster congressional cooption of the power to frame con-
stitutional amendments. Certainly the Framers did not anticipate this develop-
ment.23 But out of the existence of two drafting procedures has arisen the Con-
gress' opportunity to blunt reforms of its powers. Congressional preemption of
amendment conventions has proven so effective that it seems that state calls essen-
tially prod a reluctant institution rather than securing a desired amendment by an
alternative method.24
With only three more states calls being necessary to call a constitutional
amendment convention, the power to get even two more states to issue calls will
likely secure the Budget Amendment's proposal. The next rule of the federal
amending process ensures that the thirty-four or thirty-five state mark will be
achieved.
B. The Rule of Non-Recognition25 -- Ignoring State Cancellations of Calls for an
Amendment
Although states' calls for a constitutional amendment convention are statuto-
rily required to be officially recorded and printed in the Federal Register, reconsid-
erations by states are not required to be printed.26 The practice of ignoring state
rescissions of their earlier calls for a constitutional convention on a particular
amending topic has received scholarly approval.27 As a consequence, calls for a
particular amendment seem to amass unabatedly, inexorably creeping toward a
constitutionally required convention to draft the amendment.
23. To the contrary, Article V's provisions were intended to check self-dealing by federal officials. See Akhil Reed
Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLuM. L. REV. 457,460
(1994).
24. The American Bar Association's survey ofthe process of state calls for a federal amendment conventions states
the typical assumption that Congress will continue to preempt the alternative drafting process. "Since the turn of the
twentieth century, the application process has been used primarily to encourage Congress to propose specific
amendments." SPECIALCONSTUONALCONVENTONS STUDYCOMfrrEE, AMERICANBARASSOCIATION, AMENDMENT
OFTHECONSTIUnroNBYTHE CONVENTION MEmhOD UNDER ARTicLE V, at 72 (1974) [hereinafter ABA SiUDY].
25. But cf. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPTOF LAW 100-110 (2d ed. 1994) (defining a "rule of recognition" as
notifying society of which normative prescriptions carry legal significance and which constitute mere exhortations of
etiquette). The Rule of Non-Recognition here refers to a rule that even certain actions by state legislatures that should
have constitutional effect are nonetheless ignored by federal officials.
26. See 1 U.S.C. § 106b (1985).
27. See, e.g., ABA STRDY, supra note 23, at 32 ("There is no law dealing squarely with the question of whether
a state may withdraw an application seeking a constitutional convention, although some commentators have suggested
that a withdrawal is of no effect."); F. E. Packard, Rescinding Memorialization Resolutions, 30 CH!.-KENrL. REv. 339
(1952) (arguing that state rescissions of earlier calls for an amendment should be ignored).
20001
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This result defies basic democratic principles underlying the Constitution
because it furthers fundamental governmental change regardless of whether a
once-desired amendment still enjoys popular support. One defender of the rule,
however, noted that a state's attempt to cancel an earlier ratification also goes ig-
nored. Thus, it would be illogical to allow states to rescind calls for amendments
but disallow them to rescind earlier ratifications.28 A similar argument notes that
Congress's lack of power to retract an amendment once proposed should mean
that states too lack power to retract called-for amendments.2 9
As a consequence of this rule, the number of states understood to have called
for the Budget Amendment will only increase. As a matter of practical reality,
Congress will prove unable to ignore the requirement to call a constitutional
amendment convention as long as state calls for a Budget Amendment continue to
secure broad public support.3" And the next rule of the amending process, also not
reflected in the Constitution itself, demonstrates how a little persuasion on behalf
of a popular amendment can go a long way.
C. The "Ant and the Rubber-tree Plant" Rule
31
Under certain circumstances, a single person can prod enough states legisla-
tures to take action on a federal amendment to satisfy Article V requirements.
Gregory Watson provides an example of just such a circumstance with the
Twenty-Seventh Amendment's ratification. In what proved to be largely one-man
campaign, Mr. Watson's efforts culminated with thirty-three state legislatures'
ratification of what became the Twenty-Seventh Amendment.32
In Mr. Watson's case, several factors combined in his favor in addition to his
own dedication. First, the amendment had been drafted to curtail the ability of
members of Congress to self deal by giving themselves immediate pay raises.
Thus, the political cost to state legislators who voted in favor of the amendment
was minimal. State legislators themselves did not stand to lose anything by the
28. See F. E. Packard, Constitutional Law: The States and the Amending Process, 45 A.B.A.J. 161, 162-63
(1959).
29. See id. at 340-42.
30. But the one-way ratcheting effect ofignoring state rescissions ofcalls divorces this step of the amending process
from a contemporary consensus of support for the proposal, especially if most state calls came many years earlier.
Congress might thus be tempted not to convene a convention to propose an amendment that has become unpopular
among the American electorate as well as its own members. Such a result, of course, would directly conflict with the
constitutional framework for the amending process. The Federalist argued that "it is not to be inferred from this
principle that the representatives of the people, whenever a momentary inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of
their constituents incompatible with the provisions in the existing Constitution would, on that account, be justifiable in
a violation of those provisions... "' THE FEDERAliST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). Yet, the statutorily established rule of recording state calls, but not later state reconsiderations, endows the
second procedure for originating an amendment with an inevitability that invites a Congress comply with current public
opinion by ignoring the calls. Cf I U.S.C. § 106b (1985).
31. Cf. FRANK SINAiRA, High Hopes, on THE CAPrroL COLLECIOR'S SERES (Capitol Records 1989).
32. See Richard B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy ofthe Tiventy-Seventh Amendment,
61 FoRDHAML. REV. 497,538-39 & n.214, 555 (1992). "Watson waged a lonely ten-year campaign to add it to the
Constitution despite the conventional wisdom 'shared by most politicians, historians, and legal scholars' that the 1789
proposal was a dead letter." Id. at 536.
[Vol. 35:353
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Amendment's adoption. Second, Mr. Watson did not need to worry about the
number of states counted in favor of the amendment because -- as with calls for an
amendment -- the ratification process does not count states that withdraw their
support on reconsideration.33 Thus, Mr. Watson remained free to focus only on
states that had not yet acted in favor of the amendment. Third, and most impor-
tantly, the anti-salary grab effect of the Amendment proved popular among Ameri-
cans.
3 4
The Budget Amendment poses a similar situation. First, the political cost to
state legislators who call for the amendment is low because the amendment con-
strains the powers of federal legislators only. Second, state reconsiderations may
not reduce the tally of states that have called for the amendment. Third, Ameri-
cans overwhelmingly support a constitutional amendment requiring a balanced
federal budget. If a single person can secure dozens of state ratifications of the
congressional compensation amendment, it is possible that another group can
achieve two more state calls for the Budget Amendment. At that point, Congress
can be expected to propose the amendment for ratification by three-quarters of the
states.
II. THE BUDGET AMENDMENT'S RATIFICATION BY THREE-QUARTERS OF THE
STATES
A. The Rule Disallowing a State to Rescind its Earlier Ratification of an Amend-
ment
The rule against rescissions does not appear in the Constitution, which sim-
ply provides that an amendment becomes valid "when ratified by the Legislatures
of three-fourths of the several States .... ,,a Instead, the rule arises out of long-
standing congressional precedent combined with Supreme Court precedent that
Congress has "plenary" power over the amending process.3 6 Numerous commen-
tators support this rule which allows a state to repeatedly reject an amendment
before finally ratifying, but disallows a ratification to be reconsidered.37
The rule disallowing state rescissions, however, thwarts Article V's effec-
tiveness in checking federal power. In the amending process, Congress and the
states, in their ratifying capacity, exist as co-equals. Both Congress and the states
33. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
34. Bernstein, supra note 32, at 542.
35. U.S. CONST. art. V.
36. SAMuEtS.FREEDMAN&PAMtlAJ.NAUGHTON, ERA: MAYASTATECHANGErrsVOTE? 15-18 (1978) (defending
congressional practice ofignoringstaterescissions of earlier ratifications of federal constitutional amendments); see also
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433,448-30 (1938).
37. See, e.g., Yyonne B. Burke, Validity of Attempts to Rescind Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment, 8
U.W.L.A. L. REv. 1, 3 (1973); DoddAmending the Federal Constitution, 30 YALE. L.J. 322 (1921); Lynn A. Fishell,
Reversals in the Federal Constitutional Amendment Process: Efficacy of State Ratifications of the Equal Rights
Amendment, 49 IND. LJ. 147, 147 (1973); Leo Kanowitz & Marilyn Klinger, Can a State Rescind Its Equal Rights
Amendment Ratification: Who Decides and How?, 28 HAsT. LJ. 979, 1001 (1977).
2000]
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perform federal functions in determining whether to adopt amendments to the Uni-
ted States Constitution.38 Hamilton believed that the states, rather than Congress,
would "finally decide" the fate of proposed amendments. 39 But during most of this
nation's history, Congress has had the last say by ignoring states' attempts to re-
scind their earlier ratifications. Most commentators expect this congressional pre-
cedent to continue.40 As a consequence, the number of states counted as having
ratified the Budget Amendment will invariably increase.
As with the practice of ignoring cancellations of calls for an amendment, this
rule imposes a one-way directionalism on the amending process that conflicts with
democratic principle. Constitutional amendments should owe their ratification to
widespread contemporary support rather than a non-constitutional rule arising out
of congressional practice.4 ' Moreover, the rule allows Congress a say in the ratifi-
cation stage of the amending process when the Constitution allows states only to
decide the fate of an amendment. The rule of ignoring rescissions makes the ratifi-
cation of the Budget Amendment a sure thing, especially when considered in con-
junction with the next rule that also prevents cancellation of ratifications.
B. The Rule Allowing Perpetuities
A state never acts too late in ratifying an amendment. In the federal constitu-
tional amending process, the dead hand of the past seems to continue to produce
new amendments. In 1789, James Madison drafted an amendment that was ex-
pected to be ratified in the 90's. In fact, the amendment did become part of the
Constitution in '92, but not 1792. Instead, the amendment was finally ratified in
1992, more than two centuries after its proposal. The Twenty-Seventh Amend-
ment proves that the rule against perpetuities does not apply to the amending pro-
cess even it does govern the acquisition of property.42 Instead, ratifications count
regardless of their timeliness.
This rule that ratifications do not expire contradicts a Supreme Court ruling
that amendments must be timely ratified to reflect a "contemporary consensus" of
the people. In 1921, the Court ruled what is now the Twenty-Seventh Amendment
38. See Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1303 (1974).
39. TI FEDERALIsTNo. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, at
558.
40. See infra note 34.
41. Until the adoption of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment by Congress in 1992, most twentieth century
constitutional scholars assumed that amendments needed to be adopted in a sufficiently short time to reflect ongoing
support for the fundamental governmental change. The amount of time that could elapse before an amendment expired,
however, remained a point ofcontention. See Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368,375-76 (1921) (holding that amendments
must be ratified quickly enough to reflect a "contemporary consensus," without defining time thereby encompassed).
42. Specifically, the ability of members of Congress to acquire immediately larger salaries. The Rule Against
Perpetuities disallows property to come into possession more than 21 years after the life of someone alive when the
document was drafted. The amending process rule, however, allows an amendment to become part of the Constitution
no matter how long after its creation that it secures the necessary ratifications. The rationale of disallowing people to
control their posterity should apply with equal force in the constitutional context as in the property context. Thomas
Jefferson, for example, argued that no generation had the right to impose a constitution or debts on future generations.
Thus, federal debts and constitutions should expire within 20 years. LEVlSH. KMMEL FEDERALBUDI ErAND FISCAL
POLiCY 1789-1958, at 14 (1959).
[Vol. 35:353
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had expired.43 This "contemporary consensus" rule in turn has conflicted with
practical experience under another rule -- also articulated by the Supreme Court --
that Congress has "plenary" power to determine whether an amendment is timely
ratified.4 With its plenary power over the amending process, Congress has estab-
lished several "rules," each of which undermines the democratic nature of consti-
tutional change.45  But Congress's ability to act in its own best interest has not
gone without protest.
C. The Rule of Equal and Opposite Reactions
In reaction to congressional self dealing, states have exercised their co-equal-
ity with Congress in the amending process by ratifying amendments to curtail con-
gressional prerogatives. Although the usual hierarchy of federalism prevents
states from exercising control over Congress, states act as Congress's equal when
ratifying or calling for federal amendments.' Accordingly, states have used this
authority to protest perceived abuses of congressional power.
Perhaps the clearest examples of congressional self-dealing have involved
instances in which members of Congress gave themselves large, immediate pay
raises. Particularly egregious was the so-called Salary Grab Act in 1873 when
Congress raised its salary significantly both prospectively and retroactively.47 The
American public expressed outrage, and Ohio protested by ratifying the compen-
sation amendment that had been proposed a century earlier.48 Similarly, Wyoming
protested Congress's 1977 self-given pay raise by ratifying what was by then an
43. Dillon, 256 U.S. at 375-76; see also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 451-54 (1938) (stating that Congress
could determine a pending amendment to lapse within 13 years).
44. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 459. Justice Black concurred with this conclusion: "Undivided control of that process
has been given by the Article exclusively and completely to Congress. The process itself is 'political' in its entirety,
from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control,
or interference at any point." Even under the subsequently announced textual-commitment test of Baker v. Car, this
reading of Article V would still require abstention to the extent that the Constitution expressly commits all power to
resolve amending process issues. Article V, however, does not so provide. See generally Walter Dellinger, The
Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1983) (arguing
for justiciability of amending process issues).
45. In characterizing congressional practices as amending process "rules," I do so in two senses: (1) "the customary
or normal condition, occurrence, practice, etc." THERANDOMHOUSECOLLEGEDICIONARY 1153 (Rev. ed. 1988). And,
(2) in a normative, legal sense "to exercise authority, dominion, or sovereignty." (Id.) In the first aspect, Congress's
practice ofignoring state rescissions since the promulgation of the Fourteenth Amendment deserves to be called a rule.
But in the second, legal aspect the description of this practice of disregarding rescissions as a "rule" proves more
problematic because of the nature of congressional precedent.
"Congressional precedent" proves an oxymoron upon examination in light of the fact that no session of Congress can
find a future session of Congress to adhere to any rule regardless of pedigree or wisdom. Charles Black, Jr.,Amending
the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 Yale L.J. 189,191 (1972). Nonetheless, some commentators defend
congressional precedents as authoritative in rejecting state rescissions. FREDMAN &NAUGHTON, supra note 33, at 15-
18. The Court too has trusted legislative precedent in ceding plenary power over amending process issues to Congress.
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433,450,459 (1939). But in doing so, both the Court and commentators accept that
amending process rules founded on congressional practicebe subjectto continual reevaluation and revision by each new
session of Congress.
46. See Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1303 (1975).
47. Congress awarded itself two-years' worth of back pay in addition to a significant increase in future salaries.
See Bernstein, supra note 32, at 534.
48. Although no other state joined Ohio in ratifying the compensation amendment, Ohio's action contributed to
Congress's repeal of the Salary Grab Act. Id.
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almost two-century-old amendment. For a third time, during the 1980's and early
90's, other states reacted to seemingly constant congressional pay raises by contin-
uing to ratify the compensation amendment.4 9 Episodes of outrage over congres-
sional self-giving pushed the Twenty-Seventh Amendment toward constitutional
enactment.
Similarly, the American public has increasingly grown irate about federal
deficit spending as congressional spending habits increasingly appear to constitute
self-dealing.5" "All this is extremely convenient for politicians, because they can
enact programs now, and get the political credit for them, while worrying about
actually paying for them later.""1 If this irritation over perceived congressional
self-dealing in the budgeting process secures even a few more sporadic ratifica-
tions, then the Budget Amendment will achieve success in much the same way as
did the Twenty-Seventh Amendment. Remember that the time elapsed does not
cause pending amendments to expire. Unless an express ratification deadline ac-
companies the Budget Amendment's proposal, ratification will be as certain as its
timing will be uncertain.
D. The Rule Allowing Congress to Extend an Express Ratification Time Limit
(Plus a Possible Bonus Rule!)
In all likelihood, Congress will subject the ratification of the Budget Amend-
ment to the same seven-year ratification deadline as has been imposed since the
proposal of the Eighteenth Amendment. 2 Given the widespread popularity of an
amendment to balance the federal budget, no more than seven years will likely be
necessary. Aside from the exceptional Twenty-Seventh Amendment, no extant
Amendment has taken even four years to secure ratification.53 But even Con-
gress's proposal of the Budget Amendment with a seven-year time limit will not
necessarily cause ratification to fail if it requires more than seven years. If Con-
gress does extend the ratification deadline, the Court cannot be expected to
disagree, or even to consider the issue. Chief Justice Rehnquist has indicated that
the Court may be in no mood to discontinue its half-century of abstention on
amending process questions.54
In extending the ratification deadline, Congress may decide again to seek
presidential approval. Professor Black has argued that any extension of time to
ratify must comply with the constitutional requirement that "Every Bill which
49. See id. at 535.
50. See, e.g., ALFREDL.MALABREJR.,BEYoNDOuRMANs: HowAMERicA'sLONGYEARS oFDEfrDEF CnsAND
RECKLESS BORROW NGNOWTHREAKTSTOOvERwHELUS 4(1988).
51. GORDONsupra note 9, at 188.
52. ExceptfortheNineteenth Amendment, Congress hasimposedseven-yearratification deadlines since 1917. U.S.
CONST. amends. XVIII, XX-XXII. To avoid clutter in the Constitution, the ratification deadline has been transmitted
at the same time as proposal, instead of within the amendments' texts. See U.S. CONST. amends. XXIII-XXVI.
53. TheTwenty-SecondAmendmenttook thelongest, requiring 3 years and 11 months for ratification. U.S. CONsT.
amend. XXII (proposed Mar. 24, 1947, and ratified Feb. 27, 1951).
54. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-03 & n.2 (1979).
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shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it be-
come a Law, be presented to the President of the United States."'55 As a practical
matter, the presidential signature seems likely to be obtained regardless of consti-
tutional necessity.5 6 Presidents have seemingly always wanted an official role in
the amending process and signing a ratification extension may provide a welcome
opportunity to continue on an inroad made by President Carter. President Carter
signed the resolution passed by Congress to extend the ratification deadline of the
proposed equal rights amendment.5 The presidential signature may also be forth-
coming to avoid the appearance of defeating the popular amendment.
But why would Congress vote to extend a ratification deadline for an amend-
ment that its members do not want? The power of the states to force an amend-
ment convention again provides the reason: nothing prevents states from issuing
calls while a congressionally drafted version of the amendment pends ratification.
Article V, however, was intended to present "every amendment to the Constitution
[as] a single proposition [to] be brought forward singly."58 Nonetheless, Article V
does not prevent two amendments -- one drafted by Congress and another by an
amendment convention -- from circulating at the same time.59 Congress, however,
may attempt to preclude a more radical version of the amendment from competing
with its own version.
Congress, despite its plenary power over the amending process, cannot pre-
vent additional states from issuing calls for the Budget Amendment. Neither can
Congress fiddle with the tally of states calling for a Budget Amendment by sud-
denly counting state cancellations because the record-keeping function has been
ceded to an executive branch official.
E. The Record-Keeping Rule of 1 U.S.C. § 106(b)
By statute, the Archivist of the United States keeps count of state ratifica-
tions of and calls for federal constitutional amendments. Congress long ago sur-
rendered the prerogative to make the initial determination whether sufficient states
have complied with Article V. In so doing, Congress has invited the possibility
that the final outcome of ratification be determined by the person charged only
with keeping the tally.
55. Charles L. Black, Jr., On Article , Section 7, Clause 26And the Amendment ofthe Constitution, 87 YA.ELJ.
896,899 (1978).
56. Past presidents have signed amendments beforebeing proposed to the states for ratification even while knowing
that their signatures had no legal effect. For example, President Buchanon signed the proposed slavery-entrenching
Corwin Amendment. BERNSIEN & AGE , supra note 15, at 91. Then President Lincoln signed the Thirteenth
Amendment when it was proposed to the states for ratification. Id. at 100. But see Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 378, 382 (1798) (holding that Article V process does not require presidential approval).
57. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Ratification ofthe Equal Rights Amendment: A Question of Time, 57 TMEx L.REV.
919, 930 (1979). Hollingsworth does not address this issue, and President Carter might have established a toehold in
the amending process.
58. THE FDmEliAsT No. 85, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
59. The Framers emphasized that Congress has no power to decline calling a constitutional amendment convention
once three-quarters of the state legislatures have called for a particular amendment. See, e.g., TimFEDERA=iSTNo. 85,
at 525 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Once three-quarters of the states have ratified an amendment, the Archivist
of the United States transmits a list of the ratifying states to Congress along with
his or her certificate.' The Archivist performs this duty within an independent
agency of the executive branch, remaining subject to removal by the President.6
The Archivist's official function in the federal amending process officially encom-
passes only the duty to keep and transmit records of state calls and ratifications to
Congress. Nonetheless, the timing of the Archivist's decision to certify that
amendment has received the requisite number of ratifications can force Congress
to recognize the amendment's validity.6"
On at least one occasion the Archivist's decision to certify an amendment as
properly ratified seems to have trumped Congress's prerogative to determine
whether or not to promulgate an amendment. In 1992, the Archivist certified that
the compensation amendment had received the requisite number of ratifications to
become the Twenty-Seventh Amendment of the Constitution. Congressional lead-
ership expressed consternation with the Archivist's decision to certify the amend-
ment without first consulting with them. Both houses of Congress undertook to
examine the constitutional validity of the geriatric amendment. But under the cir-
cumstances, the Archivist's decision proved falt accompli.
At the time of the Archivist's certification, congressional elections loomed
and the political costs of voting against the popularly supported compensation
amendment did not seem worth the price regardless of the constitutionality of its
tardy ratification. Indeed, the issue of the ratification's timeliness seemed irrele-
vant in light of the 99-0 Senate and 414-3 House vote in favor of approving the
amendment.63 The lopsided vote shows the conclusive effect of certification by
Archivist on election-year politics.
To date, no amendment ever certified by the executive branch official
charged with keeping track of ratifications has been rejected by Congress or the
courts.64 Were the Archivist to certify the Budget Amendment during an election
60. See 1 U.S.C. § 106b (1985).
61. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 2102,2103(a) (1991). Upon removing the Archivist, the President "shall communicate the
reasons for any such removal to each House of the Congress." 44 U.S.C. § 2103(a) (1991).
62. In effect, an unelected federal official can pass judgment on the constitutional validity of actions taken by two-
thirds of the members of both houses of Congress and three-quarters of the states. Even the rule of congressional
promulgation seems more desirable insofar as it submits the outcome of the amending process to a large, popularly
elected legislative body. But cf Dellinger, supra note 44 (arguing against congressional promulgation of amendment).
An ideal solution would dispense with the prerogative of any federal officials to negate or fictitiously supply the
ratifications of a sufficient number of states to comply with Article V requirements. Indeed, the Constitution does not
provide for any state action beyond the ratification of the last state constituting a three-quarters super-majority. As a
practical matter, however, some form of record-keeping and notification of ratification is necessary. See HART, supra
note 25, at 100-10.
63. TheArchivist's certification also "persuaded most constitutional scholars to accept the amendment." Bernstein,
supra note 32, at 542.
64. The record-keeping dutyhasbeen shouldered by executive branch officials almost from the start. "From 1791
through 1818, the Secretary of State carried out the duty of certi fying amendments as a matter of course; in 1818,
Congress enacted a statute officially assigning the Secretary that responsibility. In 1951, Congress amended the statute
to transfer the responsibility to the Administrator of General Services, who supervised the publication of the Federal
Register, andin 1984, yet another statute transferred both tasks to the Archivist of the United States." BERNsei&
AGEL, supra note 16, at 246 n.*.
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year, Congress might acquiesce on a somewhat questionable ratification. Con-
gress cannot always be expected to impartially assess the technical constitutional-
ity of an amendment that originated in reaction to perceptions of congressional
self-dealing. The broader the public support for the amendment, the more likely
that Congress will acquiesce to popular pressure.
Congressional votes on the Anti-salary grab Amendment have already shown
the reluctance of members to vote against the amendment if they face election. In
the 1995 vote on the amendment in the Senate, all five of the senators who
switched from an earlier "no" to "yes" votes faced reelection in the next year.65
However, "[o]f the six senators who switched from "yes" to "no," thus sealing the
amendment's defeat, none face re-election sooner than 1998, by which time [the
1995] vote may well be politically irrelevant. '66 Similarly, the 1997 vote on the
Budget Amendment failed by a narrow margin, one vote. The deciding senator
who voted against the amendment -- even though he had earlier voted in favor of
the amendment on three separate occasions -- did not face reelection for another
six years.67 Although the Article V process creates law outside of the ordinary
legislative process, Article I elections may determine whether Congress accepts the
Budget Amendment's validity. Perhaps equally ironic is that the Budget Amend-
ment's promulgation may be effectively determined by someone within the execu-
tive branch as disallowed by Hollinsworth v. Virginia.68
Practices and precedents not grounded in Article V may largely determine
successful the adoption of the Budget Amendment as part of the Constitution.
Congressional precedents and executive branch determinations of amending pro-
cess issues seem to flout Supreme Court rulings. With the addition of a few more
constitutionally problematic practices and precedents, non-constitutional rules
seem to portend the subsequent repeal of the Budget Amendment.
IV. CONGRESS PROPOSES THE REPEAL AMENDMENT TO STATE RATIFYING CON-
VENTIONS
A. The Law of War and Peace
Americans would have lost the War of Independence if they had not incurred
massive debts in the process. Even George Mason, possibly the most ardent oppo-
nent of bills of credit at the Philadelphia convention, recognized the occasional
need to incur large national deficits. "Though he had a mortal hatred to paper
money, yet as he could not foresee all emergences, he was unwilling to tie the
65. Mark Z. Barabak, Balanced-budget About-face Leaves Feinstein Credibility Insecure, SAN DEGo UNION-
TRIBuNE, March 4, 1995, at A3.
66. Id.
67. Senator Torricelli remained undecided until the last day because "he was in the strongest position to withstand
the pressure because he had won election [50 days earlier] by a convincing margin." Brett Pulley, Torricelli in
Spotlight and on the Spot, N.Y. TIamS, Feb. 27, 1997, at A9.
68. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378,382(1798).
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hands of the Legislature. He observed that the late war could not have been car-
ried on, had such a prohibition existed. ' 69 Alexander Hamilton too appreciated the
ability of a national debt to consolidate disparate state interests into a unified na-
tional interest and to help defend that nation.7" Both Mason and Hamilton proved
prophetic: the kind of emergencies that this nation has faced were not anticipated
and could not have been overcome without incurring debt. One writer has
asserted:
[T]he U.S. has again and again used the national debt to triumph over emergen-
cies. In the 1860s we increased the debt 42-fold to save the Union. In the
1930s we increased it 2.5 times to save the U.S. economy. In the 1940s we
more than tripled it to save Western civilization.7
While congressional borrowing power can be constrained by constitutional amend-
ment, the emergencies requiring deficit spending cannot be eliminated in times of
war or peace.
The ability of a nation to borrow on credit can mean the difference between
military victory and defeat, between prosperity and prolonged economic hardship.
Armed conflicts provide clear examples of recurring crises that require mobiliza-
tion of national resources through deficit spending. By the time of the Constitu-
tion's founding, Hamilton perceived that "[i]n the modern system of war, nations
the most wealthy are obliged to have recourse to large loans." '72 The American
experience has born out Hamilton's observation.73 During times of war, Ameri-
cans have proven willing to pay very high taxes and to have the government incur
large amounts to debt to meet the needs of the crisis.74 Not surprisingly, the con-
gressionally drafted versions of the Budget Amendment have contained an excep-
tion for times of war. But even this may not be enough because not all instances
of necessary resort to federal deficit spending occur during times of military con-
flict.
During times of peace, deficit spending can secure future prosperity. For
example, the large federal deficit incurred in the Louisiana Purchase presented an
opportunity during times of peace to extend the nation's security and development.
"In 1803, the federal government spent less than $8 million in operations. Thanks
to its good credit, however, it was able to borrow $15 million to fund the Louisi-
ana Purchase, adding a million square miles of the earth's finest agricultural land
69. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 309 (statement of George Mason).
70. See Alexander Hamilton, First Report on the Public Credit (Jan. 9, 1790), reprinted in ALANDER
HAMILToN'S PAPERS ON PUBUC CREDIT, CoMMERcE, AND FInANcE (Samuel McKee, Jr. ed., 1957).
71. Gordon, supra note 12, at A18; see also GORDON, supra note 9, at 174 ("So surely Hamilton was right, and
the American national debt has been an immense, indeed global, blessing.").
72. THEFEDERA STNo. 31, at 192 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
73. See GORDON4,supra note 9, at 67 ("While individual battles may be decided by tactics, firepower, courage, and
- of course- luck, victory in the long haul of war almost always goes to the side better able to turn the national wealth
to military purposes. That usually means the ability to borrow.").
74. Seeid. at76. Warbonddrivesforexample, appear as patriotic efforts rather than undesirable deficit spending.
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to the country's territory."75 Just as mortgage loans allow families to acquire their
own homes long before they could without resort to debt, so too federal deficit
spending has financed important national improvements.76
Throughout United States history, federal deficit spending has helped "pro-
vide for the common defence, and promote the general Welfare" by facilitating
greater use of national resources than could have been employed without the debt.
The law of economic necessity in times of war and in times of peace cannot be
repealed. Failure to effectively employ debt financing has lost wars7 7 and shrunk-
en national territories. Further, the next law of the economic cycle provides that
failure to engage in federal deficit spending can trigger economic collapse.
B. The Law of the Economic Cycle
Federal deficit spending can mitigate the pernicious effects of economic de-
pression and securities markets emergencies. Conversely, the failure to ensure
adequate financial liquidity or the imposition of higher taxes to fund government
obligations during times of recession can worsen the plight of Americans. As a
matter of well-accepted economic theory, the government's ability engage in defi-
cit spending plays a central role in the maintenance of the economic health of the
United States.
The Great Depression, and the events leading up to it, provide illustrate the
dangers attending an unshakable adherence to a federal balanced budget. "When
the Depression began in 1929, federal budget policy was firmly anchored to the
idea that the budget should be balanced annually. A balanced budget was re-
garded as the principal test of fiscal management."'78 Even two years into the De-
pression, President Hoover remained doggedly determined to balance the budget
and pay the national debt by cutting federal spending and raising taxes. "We can-
not squander ourselves into prosperity," he argued.7 9 The extreme lack of finan-
75. Gordon, supra note 12, atA18.
76. One writer has also likened the national debt to another individual means of employing debt. "[S]ince its
creation in the early 1790s, the national debt has been one of this country's biggest boons, just as a credit card can be
in a family emergency. Almost overnight, it transformed the U.S. from a financial basket case into the best credit risk
in the world." Gordon, supra note 12, at Al8.
77. During the Civil War, the Union employed debt financing much more efficiently than the Confederate states,
which were unable to effectively collect taxes or borrow on credit. The Union encountered great difficulty in financing
its war efforts. Even though the Union proved able to efficiently collect taxes, these revenues alone did not suffice.
Thus there was a need to borrow on credit. The difficulty with borrowing, however, was that foreign nations were
unwilling make loans to the Union because the South was expected to win any armed conflict. MARGARETG. MYERs,
A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 149 (1970). Moreover, banks were unable to assume many more
governmental obligations. But an ingenious system was devised: efforts to sell Union debts were directed "toward the
great mass of small investors who had never before purchased government or any other securities." Id. at 161. Jay
Cooke, who formulated the plan, "recognized what Alexander Hamilton had earlier pointed out, that owners of
government bonds would have a deeper concern for the welfare of their country." Id. By contrast, the Confederate
government was unable to efficiently collect taxes because of the need to rely on voluntary compliance by individual
states. Neither was the Confederacy able to borrow, even though foreign nations were more likely to lend to the South
than the North. For lack of ability to borrow, both civilian welfare and war efforts were hampered. Id. at 167-69. The
inability to borrow effectively or to compel state compliance with taxation mandates similarly undermined both the
Confederate government in the 1860's and the government under the Articles of Confederation in the 1780's.
78. KnamEL, supra note 42, at 143.
79. Id. at 148. Even the opposing party in Congress acquiesced to this economic policy.
20001
15
Ishikawa: The Stealth Amendment: The Impending Ratification and Repeal of a
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1999
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
cial liquidity of this economic policy dried up the purchasing power needed to re-
vive the economy. 80 Governmental austerity exacerbated and prolonged the De-
pression."
Even assuming that the Budget Amendment allows waiver of its provisions
by three-fifths vote of Congress, the imposition of a supermajority requirement on
both houses promises difficulty in securing deficit spending. In times of economic
malaise, the divisive nature of partisan politics greatly increases the difficulty of
cooperation needed for supermajority vote requirements. It is perhaps an irony
that failure to outspend federal income can exacerbate economic downturns.
This law of the economic cycle requires financial liquidity to periodically
exceed income from tax and other federal revenues in order to alleviate economic
recession. The economic cycle cannot be repealed. Economists, however, con-
tinue to propose solutions involving government spending and monetary policies at
odds with the intended constraints of the Budget Amendment.
8 2
C. As a Rule, Accounting Gimmicks Are More Easily Resorted to Than Real
Spending Reductions
Experience has shown that constitutional amendments do not always secure
the results that their supporters anticipate. As Professor Bernstein has noted,
"The amending process sometimes produces results different than the expectations
of those who set it in motion." 83 The Budget Amendment's supporters anticipate
much from its constraints on federal deficit spending. Some writers expect the
amendment to be a panacea.84 Specifically, most expect that Congress will adopt
annual budgets in which taxation and other federal revenues at least equal spend-
ing. However attractive this vision may be now, the Budget Amendment's actual
effect may prove far less satisfying.
Respect for the Budget Amendment can be expected to erode to the extent
that accounting gimmicks substitute for meaningful budget reform. Although sup-
ports hope to curtail federal deficit spending, Congress may discover that other
tactics yield a balanced budget more easily. "Consider New York state, which
balanced its budget a few years ago by the simple expedient of selling Attica State
Prison to itself: The Urban Development Corp., a state agency, borrowed money
80. In response, many plans were made to stimulate spending in every area except in federal governmental outlays.
Id. at 173.
81. See MYERs, supra note77, at 309 ("The effect on the economy of increased taxes at this low point ofdepression
was given small consideration. Fiscal policy had not yet appeared on the scene.") Financing governmental spending
by taxes instead of borrowing went nearly unquestioned.
82. See, e.g.,MALABRE, supra note 50, at 69-78 (discussing Keynesian, Monetarist, and Supply-Side approaches).
83. BERNSWEIN&AGEL, supra note 16, at 136.
84. See, e.g., MICHAEL BABUNAKIS, BUDGET REFORM FOR GovERNiMEN A COMPREHENSIVi ALLOCATION AND
MANAGMEN FSYS'IF(CAMS) 111-12(1982): "The passage ofsuch an amendment.., can result in diminished taxes,
lower interest and inflationary rates, and the reduced likelihood of induced recessions because of the constraint the
amendment will place on federally induced inflation. The private savings rate will increase to permit more investment
and productivity gains." But see Martin A. Sullivan, CBO: A Balanced Budget Would Have 'Slight' Impact on
Economic Growth, 71 TaxNotes426-27 (1996) ("Howslightistheincreasein economic growth? [T]henominal rate
of growth in 2006 would be little over 4.9 percent instead of a little under 4.9 percent.").
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in the bond market, turned the money over to the state, and took title to the
prison."85 Similarly, projections of income from federal taxation and revenues
needed to determine whether the federal budget remains balance constitute edu-
cated guesses at best and, in a more cynical light, politically formulated
numbers.8 6 And the advent of budget constraints will invite greater manipulations
of the assumptions in estimating future income and outlays. "There is an enor-
mous temptation to fudge the numbers. The temptation arises because there is an
important asymmetry between the political implications of changing a program in
order to achieve an outlay target and changing economic or other assumptions."87
Even in the best of economic circumstances, Congress might avoid making politi-
cally difficult spending reductions and flout the intended effect of the Budget
Amendment by engaging in creative accounting practices.
This is to say nothing of the waiver provisions expressly drafted into the
Budget Amendment -- in times of military conflict or by vote three-fifths vote of
Congress. Thus, members of Congress can comply with the Budget Amendment's
provisions and still engage in deficit spending. Current pressures to spend Will not
abate. Congress will continue to seek benefits for their constituencies, favorite
programs, and popular entitlement programs. Compliance with the Budget Amend-
ment's goal of spending reduction may have greater political drawbacks than pres-
ervation of entitlements.
Current support for the Budget Amendment comes at a time when neither
party in Congress dares to cut entitlements, even though they constitute three-
quarters of federal outlays.88 Once the Budget Amendment requires entitlement
cuts to meet its mandate, public support for compliance will almost certainly
dwindle.89 The prospect of cuts to popular entitlement programs will undermine
support for the Budget Amendment's constraints. Waivers and accounting tricks
will further erode respect for the amendment to the extent that Congress and the
public consider the amendment ineffective. Budget Amendment proposals arising
in Congress "have not been very strict, have left loopholes for congressional over-
ride, and most significantly, have not provided for enforcement in case Congress
does not meet the amendment's requirements." 90 The unenforceability of the Bud-
get Amendment's provisions invites Congress to waive its provisions by simply
ignoring it.
85. Gordon, supra note 12, at A18.
86. See Rudolph G. Penner, Forecasting Budget Totals: Why Can't We Get It Right?, in THEFEDERALBuDGEr.
EcONMICS AND PoLmlcs 90 (Aaron Wildavsky & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1982).
87. Id. at 98.
88. Even in today's rosy economic climate, there exists a great reluctance to address the effect of entitlements on
the federal budget and national economy: "The lesson ofthe latest budget is that entitlements in general, and Social
Security in particular, are still sacred; so sacred that even sensible first steps to put them on sounder financial footing
are discarded as too risky. And if politicians are so frightened now, when all the economic indicators are favourable
and deficits are at record lows, when will they ever have the nerve to try?" The Lovebirds' Budget: Agreeing to be
Nice Does not Solve America's Problems, THE ECONOMIST, May 10, 1997, at 18.
89. See infra text accompanying note 109.
90. Ondrea D. Riley, Comment, Annual Federal Deficit Spending: Sending the Judiciary to the Rescue, 34
SANA CLARA L. REv. 577,589 (1994).
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D. An Unenforceable Rule Is a Rule Meant to Be Broken
The Budget Amendment seems destined to be unenforceable. None of the
versions of the Amendment that have reached floor votes in Congress have pro-
vided an enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance. Self-policing cannot be
expected. To the contrary, public support for the amendment has arisen out of
Congress's failed attempts to force budgetary discipline on itself by statute.91 Al-
though some versions of the Budget Amendment have recognized the role of the
President in the federal budget process, the President cannot be expected to en-
force the amendment.
Contrary to the expectations of the founding generation, presidents appear
more as champions of fiscal austerity than of governmental largess. Presidents
have tried to reduce deficit spending by impounding funds, asking for line-item
veto power, and an amendment to balance the federal budget.91 None of these tac-
tics have yet reduced government spending. The federal courts have invalidated
impoundment and the line-item veto as unconstitutional. 93 Even following the pas-
sage of the Budget Amendment, "executive refusal to spend unconstitutionally ex-
cessive appropriations, raises impoundment difficulties." 94 Insofar as the execu-
tive branch is charged with the duty to carry out the laws and to spend statutorily
allocated funds, this branch is ill-suited to enforce the Budget Amendment's provi-
sions. As a participant in the process of budget negotiations, the President cannot
also trump the final budget outcome without seriously disturbing the allocation of
powers under the Constitution. The next possibility would be equally disruptive of
the Constitution's allocation of duties insofar as the Budget Amendment "would
embroil federal courts in the budgetary process, which is supposed to be the prov-
ince of Congress and the Presidency., 95 Yet, resort to the federal courts would be
certain.
The federal courts cannot be expected to enforce the Budget Amendment.
As with the executive, the nature of this coordinate branch prevents effective en-
forcement. Article Ill imposes constraints on justiciability that bar the federal
courts from deciding on advisory opinions, cases in which plaintiffs lack standing,
and political questions. 6  Each of these constitutionally derived constraints
problematizes cases brought in order to enforce the Budget Amendment. The pro-
hibition on advisory opinions precludes the federal courts from following the pre-
cedents of the New Jersey courts in deciding challenges under the constitutional
requirement of a balanced state budget. "The New Jersey Supreme Court asserts a
91. See d. at581-83,588-89.
92. See GORDON, supra note 9, at 179.
93. See Local 2677, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60, 75 (D.D.C. 1973) (holding
impoundment unconstitutional); Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1997) (holding line-item veto
unconstitutional).
94. Crostwait, supra note 22, at 1069.
95. BERNSEN&AGEL, supra note 16, at 184.
96. See generally CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, THELAwoFFEDERALCOuRTS § 13, at 67-74, § 14, at 83-85(1994).
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lack of power to force the state legislature to appropriate or refrain from appropri-
ating funds, but contents itself with disapproval of legislative action.97 Merely
declaring Congress to have violated the Budget Amendment amounts to little more
than an idle act. "Aside from deciding that the budget is unbalanced and possibly
identifying which appropriations bill caused the imbalance, a court's declaration
that Congress acted unconstitutionally is essentially unhelpful."98 The advisory
nature of a case involving alleged noncompliance with the Budget Amendment
rests in part on the problem of standing and the injury needed to achieve standing.
"[U]nder present federal law, no person would have "standing" to bring suit to
compel Congress to obey the amendment."99 Citizens and private groups will al-
most certainly not meet the Court's current test for standing to sue.1 ° Even mem-
bers of Congress probably lack standing.''
The federal courts cannot enforce the Budget Amendment for reasons of co-
mity and judicially manageable standards reflected in a half-century of abstention
from amending process issues. Deciding a challenge under the Budget Amend-
ment would require "an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, politi-
cal, social, and economic, which can hardly be said to be within the appropriate
range of evidence receivable in a court of justice [and which] would [amount to]
an extravagant extension of judicial authority. '10 2 That the federal courts will de-
cline to invade the highly charged and highly political budget process by making
spending cuts of raising taxes does not reflect undue prudence of the federal judi-
ciary. State courts that have grappled with challenges to enforce balanced budget
requirements in their state constitutions have already declined on similar grounds.
In Maryland, for example, the state's highest court found the state constitution's
balanced budget requirement justiciable, but avoided the decision by calling the
case moot.... In New York, the court of appeals in Wein v. Carey denied any
power to review directly the state's budget plan for conformity with the consti-
tutional requirement of a balanced budget."°3
For want of a federal judicial remedy for a political process ailment, the Budget
Amendment seems destined to the moribund status of unenforceable constitutional
provision."' 4 After all, a judicial cure would prove worse than the disease because
97. Crostwait, supra note 22, at 1094-95 (footnotes omitted).
98. Id. at 1093 ("A judicial declaration of unconstitutionality may add weight to popular outrage, but this is
precisely the kind of advisory function federal courts do not perform.").
99. BERNSI uN&AGEI, supra note 16, at 185.
100. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 482, 485 (1982); see also
Crostwait, supra note 22, at 1074-75.
101. See id. at 1076.
102. See Coleman v. Miller 307 U.S. 433,453-54 (1939). As Justice Holmes once argued, the Constitution should
not "embody a particular economic theory." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
103. Crostwait, supra note 22, at 1094-95 (footnotes omitted).
104. In this aspect, the Budget Amendment would join the Guarantee Clause. (Interestingly, the Guarantee Clause
may be gaining support for its enforceability.) See, e.g., Erwin Chermerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause
Should Be Justiciable, 65 U. CoLo. L. REv. 849 (1994).
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"repeated and essentially head-on confrontations between the life-tenured bench
and the representative branches of government will not, in the long run, be benefi-
cial to either."" °5 The prospect of the courts repeatedly appropriating the preroga-
tive of Congress to raise taxes and lower spending would fundamentally reallocate
governmental powers under the Constitution.
The Budget Amendment's ineffectiveness recalls another earlier, constitu-
tional failure to impose restraint. "If the courts could not enforce it, then the
amendment would have no teeth, and its failure would breed contempt for the Con-
stitution and the rule of law--again echoing the disaster of constitutional Prohibi-
tion.""1 6 The Budget Amendment may thus be expected to meet the same fate as
the Prohibition Amendment: repeal. Repeal of both Amendments will be due, in
no small part, to the fact that they prove unenforceable. Of course, practical prob-
lems of enforcement always come as a surprise to amendment supporters. "When
the Eighteenth Amendment took effect on January 17, 1920, most observers as-
sumed that liquor would quickly disappear from the American scene. The possi-
bility that a constitutional mandate would be ignored simply did not occur to
them.""0 7 Unlike prohibition, the Budget Amendment's constraints will not even
be enforceable in court.1"8
E. Article V Requires Only One-Fifteenth More Congressional Votes to Repeal
The Budget Amendment Than to Waive the Amendment's Constraints
The Budget Amendment proposals that have nearly passed in Congress have
incorporated provisions for waivers upon approval of three-fifths of each house.
The need for a three-fifths supermajority gives minority parties and interests stro-
ng powers to deadlock the budget process. 09 Additionally, approval of the execu-
tive must also be secured. In California, which requires a three-fifths legislative
supermajority for passage of the budget, has shown the difficulties of securing
supermajority approval for budgetary action. More often than not, the budget pro-
105. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United Inc., 454 U.S. 464,474 (1982) (quoting United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)).
106. BERNSMEN &AGEL, supra note 16, at 185. Key opponents of prohibition grew increasingly concerned about
eroding respect for constitutional law. "When they talked about loss of respect for law, they were genuinely concerned
that scoffing at prohibition might lead to disobedience to other laws. Government's ability to enforce laws was in
doubt." DAVIDE.KYVIGREPEALUNGNATIONALPROHmmoN 88(1979). National prohibition's failure caused notjust
it's own repeal, but also a reconsideration of the nature of legal reform itself. "After prohibition, American lawmakers
become cautious about launching another major attempt to reshape individual behavior. The New Deal, for instance,
setting a pattern ofreform which wouldpersist for decades, confined itself to efforts to remold the institutions or finance,
commerce, industry, and government so as to improve people's economic, social, and political opportunities." Id. at
200.
107. Id. at 20.
108. Members of Congress would not face the criminal prosecution, as was the case for thousands of people who
violated national prohibition.
109. The three-fifths supermajority will likely need to be mustered almost every year: "And now [members of
Congress] are going to pass a Balanced Budget Amendment to the Constitution. That is a laugh. It will do about as
much good as all the other feeble efforts they have made to avoid biting the bullet. Like establishing statutory debt
ceilings. How many times have they raised the ceiling during the last 20 years? Forty-one or is it 42, and still
counting.' Harold Pepperell, Why the National Debt is Not Going To Be Paid Off, 74 TAx NoiS 97, 99 (1997).
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cess fails to meet its constitutionally mandated deadline, and causes significant
financial turmoil." 0
In addition to the recurring practical problem of passing budget provisions
by supermajority, the requirement appears problematic as a matter of democratic
theory. In short, "the proposed supermajority requirements for tax increases, defi-
cit increases, and deficit spending would give the President and two-fifths plus one
of either chamber of Congress a lock on the budgetary process, frustrating demo-
cratic decision-making."' The Senate's equal representation of states regardless
of population dilutes the political power of residents of the most populous states.
The budgetary supermajority requirement further undermines the political repre-
sentation of people in larger states. The congressional supermajority requirement
also tips the balance of power in the budget process toward the president, who can
defeat a greater number of congressional votes by veto.
A Congress dominated by a different party or agenda than the President can
expect annual budget battles whose length and difficulty are exacerbated by the
Budget Amendment's constraints. Members of Congress frustrated by the amend-
ment's effect on the budget process may seek to reclaim their lost prerogatives.
The same number of votes necessary to override a presidential veto of a budget
bill also would suffice to propose the Budget Amendment's repeal. These mea-
sures could be passed together in opposition to presidential disapproval of a bud-
get overwhelmingly favored by Congress. Repeal would be facilitated by Amer-
ican's disenchantment with the increased clout of relatively small interest groups,
the need for higher taxes to offset reduced borrowing ability, and aggravation of
national economic recession.
The Budget Amendment's repeal would require only one-fifteenth more con-
gressional votes to get started than to waive the Amendment's constraints for just
one year. Waiver and repeal of the amendment do not require significantly differ-
ent numbers of congressional votes despite the very disparate effects on
Congress's one-year or permanent escape from Budget Amendment constraints.
Repeal does not even require the presidential assent required to pass an annual
budget bill. Nothing impedes Congress's ability to protest and override the exer-
cise of presidential authority by resort to the constitutional amending process.
Rather than face recurring budgetary problems made more difficult by
supermajority requirements temporary waivers, a congressional consensus can
secure a permanent waiver with the same votes needed for one-time veto override.
In contrast to the adoption of the Budget Amendment, members of Congress
voting for its repeal stand to increase their legislative powers. Political liability
for voting in favor of repeal may be more than offset by the gain in approval from
constituents who benefit from a sudden increase in local spending. Constituents
110. See CAL CoNsr. art. IV, § 12(c) ("The Legislature shall pass the budget bill by midnight on June 15 of each
year."). "Since 1971, with the exception of five budget proposals, the legislature has not submitted an approved budget
to the governor by the deadline date!' LEAGUEoFWo1MENVoTERs oF CALIFoRNLA, GuiDETO CALIFORmA GOVERNMENT
161 (14th ed. 1992).
111. BERNSTEIN&AGEL, supra note 16, at 184.
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may prove to be the driving force for the Budget Amendment's repeal. Even now,
"voter support for a balanced budget -- 80 percent in the abstract -- plummets to
the 30 percent range when Social Security is threatened."' 2 As in the past, the
federal deficit can be anticipated to shed its tarnished image in order to appear as a
blessing capable of easing economic difficulties. Congress can take advantage of
plummeting public support for the Budget Amendment by presenting the prospect
of repeal for the American electorate to decide upon. As shown in the next sec-
tion, Congress can deflect appearances of self-interest, hasten the ratifying pro-
cess, and increase the chances of the Budget Amendment's repeal by proposing the
repeal to state ratifying conventions.
V. STATE CONVENTIONS QuIcKLY REPEAL THE BUDGET AMENDMENT
A. Rule by the People -- Referenda Determine the Fate of the Budget Amendment
Repeal of the Budget Amendment will likely draw upon the precedent of the
Prohibition Amendment. Within ten months of the Twenty-First Amendment's
proposal to state ratifying conventions, national prohibition was repealed. The
rapidity of the previously untried ratification by convention method surprised both
repeal's supporters and opponents alike by achieving a faster ratification than any
previous Amendment. Although the convention method has not been resorted to
since prohibition's repeal, Congress may well choose to propose the repeal of the
Budget Amendment by this method. The advantages of ratification by state con-
ventions include its minimal political costs for federal and state legislators, speed,
and public approval of the method.
1. Avoiding Political Suicide
Members of Congress who vote in favor of the Budget Amendment's repeal
likely will want to minimize the appearance of self-aggrandizement by recapturing
unrestricted borrowing, taxing, and spending powers. An available tactic can be
to portray the proposal of the Budget Amendment's repeal as a referendum by the
people themselves rather than a congressional push. Indeed, this stratagem can
win over the American electorate and wavering members of Congress alike.
A familiar statement to students of politics is that "proposal is a neutral act al-
lowing the states to decide." . . . It is an argument that certainly wins votes.
This stance, in a legislative body like Congress, for a member who is neutral
112. Bambak, supra note 65, at A3; see also David E. Rosenbaum, G.O.P., Playing Doubtful Hand, Delays a
Balanced-Budget Vote: Fate of Proposed Amendment Seems Uncertain, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1997, at Al.
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personally or is buffeted by constituents of conflicting persuasions, gets him off
the hook.13
The method of ratification by state ratifying conventions polls the sentiment of the
American electorate more effectively than ratification by the state legislatures.
In the case of the Twenty-First Amendment, the people elected convention
delegates for the sole purpose of acting on national prohibition's repeal. State leg-
islators, by contrast, rarely campaign exclusively on the basis of their position on
a potential federal constitutional amendment. Conversely, legislators do not al-
ways remain aware of their constituents' sentiments, or vote in accordance with
the prevailing public opinion. This last point was demonstrated by Ohio's ratifica-
tion of the Prohibition Amendment. Several weeks after the Ohio state legislature
overwhelmingly voted to ratify the Eighteenth Amendment, Ohio's voters narrowly
rejected the Amendment in the only purportedly binding referendum on a federal
constitutional amendment." 4 By submitting the Budget Repeal Amendment to
state ratifying conventions, Congress can frame its proposal as one of letting the
people themselves decide. The political advantage to members of Congress in us-
ing the convention method, however, pale compared to that afforded to state legis-
lators.
Perhaps the main reason for using the convention method for the Twenty-
First Amendment was the fear that state legislators would commit "political sui-
cide' by voting for prohibition's repeal. As with national prohibition, voting
against an admirable experiment to impose virtuous restraint, such as with the
Budget Amendment, may prove too much of an admission of defeat regardless of
enforcement difficulties. Further, many state legislators who voted for the ratifica-
tion of the Budget Amendment may still be in office and continue to support the
law. Convention delegates would not face the same concerns incumbency and vot-
ing record consistency on the single subject of repeal.
In this sense, ratifying convention delegates have much in common with dele-
gates to the electoral college who vote for the President of the United States. As
intended by the Framers, these delegates are not beholden to anyone for reelection,
serving instead for a single, unrepeated purpose.115  Both types of delegates,
however, have become mere figureheads. Unlike the Framers' intention, these
delegates' ability to use their own judgment has vanished. Slow evolution of the
113. CLEN trE. VosE, CoNsaIIUIoNAL CHANGE: AmENDMENTPOLHCS AND SUPREME COURT LmGATION SINCE
1900, at 110 (1972).
114. TheUnitedStates Supreme Courtultimatelystruck downthepopularreferendum as unconstitutionallyimposing
an extra step in the Article V ratification process. Hawke v. Smith, No. 1,253 U.S. 221,227-28, 231 (1920). Ohio's
experience contributed to a growing sentiment that national prohibition had been imposed on Americans by Progressive
lawmakers who used statutory and constitutional means to impose social experiments. KYViG, supra note 104, at 16
("The image of a reform achievedby undemocratic means would fester and grow. The validity oflegislativeratification
in other states would be brought into question by the disparity between the lopsided general assembly action and the
close but contrary popular vote in Ohio."). The Twenty-First Amendment's character as a referendum of public
sentiment constituted a reaction to perceptions of the undemocratic nature of ratification by the state legislatures. Id.
at 174,181.
115. See THEFEDERAU STNo. 68, at 412-13 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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electoral college and deliberate engineering of the ratification conventions have
caused this result. Over the years, states enacted laws binding their electoral col-
lege delegates." 6 Similarly, some states bound their delegates to the convention
delegates to reflect the state voter consensus.
Alabama, Arkansas, and Oregon required delegates to vote in accordance with
a referendum on the amendment held at the same time as the delegate election.
Arizona offered the surest sign the conventions were expected to reflect the vot-
ers' choice. There, if a delegate failed to hold to the position stated on his nom-
inating petition, he would "be guilty of a misdemeanor, his vote not considered,
and his office deemed vacant."'17
These delegate restrictions constrained ratifying conventions to registering the pre-
vailing public opinion. Prohibition's opponents effectively turned the federal con-
stitutional amending process into a national referendum of the American people.
In doing so, they effectively flouted the Supreme Court's holding in Hawke v.
Smith, No. 1 in which the Court forbade a state's ratification of a federal constitu-
tional amendment to be determined by referendum of the people of a state."8
2. Congressional Influence Over the Convention Process
Although the convention method remained the only method of ratification
planned for the Constitution during most of the Philadelphia convention of 1787,
the Framers never defined how the convention process would work at either the
federal or state level. The Philadelphia convention delegates ignored Madison
when he "remarked on the vagueness of the terms, 'call a Convention for the pur-
pose. as sufficient reason for reconsidering the article. How was a Convention to
be formed? by what rule decide? what the force of its acts?"' 19 The Framers also
entirely ignored questions concerning state ratifying conventions.
Surprisingly, this nation did not face the uncertainties that Madison pointed
out for almost 150 years, despite the Framers' expectations that state conventions
would be the favored method of ratification. For the ratification of the Twenty-
First Amendment, Congress proved unable to agree upon the details and allowed
states to determine how and when to convene the ratifying conventions. Nonethe-
116. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-19-2 (Michie 1995); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6906 (West 1996); 7 FLA. STAT. ANN. §
99.021 (West 1982); 6 MISS.CODEANN. § 3-15-785 (1990). The Supreme Court has ruled that such instruction passes
muster under the Constitution. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214,223 n.10 (1952). See generally Akhil Reed Amar & Vik
Amar, President Quayle?, 78 VA. L. REv. 913,919 (1992). Professors Amar conclude that "the logic of Ray v. Blair
strongly suggests that states can bind collegians any way they choose." Id. at 943 n
117. KyviG, supra note 106, at 174.
118. 253 U.S. at 228-31; see also National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920). For a thoughtful
discussion of the strategic planning of prohibition opponents, see generally Vose, supra note 113.
119. 2 FAP RA1N,REcoRns, at 558. Madison did not oppose the convention method, either for drafting or ratifying
amendments. Instead, he anticipated "that difficulties might arise as to form, the quorum &c. which in Constitutional
regulations ought to be as much as possible avoided. 2 id. at 630.
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less, as part of Congress's power to specify the method of ratification it may be
able to mandate the dates of delegate elections and the start of the conventions.
Opponents of national prohibition urged Congress to issue such instructions in
order to prevent state truancy in convening their ratifying conventions.120 As an
added incentive, Congress could offer to pay for the costs of delegate elections and
the conventions. 121 Congress may also have the power to determine whether state
convention delegates be elected at large or by district. If so, Congress may signifi-
cantly increase an amendment's chances of ratification by taking advantage of dif-
fering rates of support among urban and rural voters. 22 Together, these congres-
sional prerogatives may give the federal government more control over the ratifica-
tion process than the Framers intended.' 23 In amending the Constitution, Congress
and the states presumably should exist as co-equals. Congress's ability to control
the timing of the convention process also may make the amending process more
subject to the "momentary inclinations" and less deliberative than Article V's de-
sign suggests.' 24
States ratified the Twenty-First Amendment within ten months, within that
short time having passed legislation for the election of delegates, organized the
conventions, and concluded the business of ratification. These hurdles were quick-
ly surmounted: "Of the forty-three states which established conventions... elev-
en acted within a month, thirty-nine within four months, of Congress's action sub-
mitting the repeal resolution."'" The delegates' election determined the outcome
before the conventions even met. "So perfunctory were the actions of the conven-
tions in carrying out voters' wishes that the question arose as to whether a simple,
direct referendum would not have been more sensible and economical.' ' 126 New
Hampshire's convention lasted only seventeen minutes.' 27
The convention method's quick ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment
could justify congressional specification of equally soon delegate elections and
conventions.
3. Seeing Economic Liability As an Asset
120. Again, this stratagem was urged to negate the power state legislatures to stymie the Repeal Amendment. See
VosE, supra note 113, at 114.
121. See id.
122. TheTwenty-First Amendment was ratified by delegates chosen from a number ofdifferent methods ofselection,
including these two. See generally VosE, supra note 113, at 117. With Twenty-First Amendment, rates of support
for repeal differed significantly among rural and urban voters. Professor Grimes, in his survey of federal constitutional
amendments, notes that several of the extant amendments rested on the support of urban Americans. ALANP. GRIMvES,
DEM~ocRAcY AND um AmNDNm To ThE CONSf1ftmN, at 109,125-56 (1978) (discussing effects of increasingly
urban demographics and the Constitution's "Urban Amendments").
123. Hamilton argued that whenever the requisite number of "States, were united in the desire for a particular
amendment, that amendment must infallibly take place." See THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
124. THEFEDERALiSTNo. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
125. KYviG, supra note 106, at 174.
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Public opinion of an amendment can reverse itself completely in the space of
a few years. An amendment that significantly affects the national coffers ties its
public approval to the rising and falling fortunes of the public fisc. Again, the
experience of national prohibition illustrates this point well. What began as an
ambitious experiment in social policy ended, in large part, as an economic failure.
Although economic considerations played in insignificant role in the adoption of
the Prohibition Amendment, "it is perfectly obvious the economic conclusions as
well as social ones contributed importantly to a public favorable to repeal."' 28 The
relatively healthy economy at the time of prohibition's adoption gave way to the
depths of the Great Depression. With the worsening of the economic plight of mil-
lions, support for prohibition "sank with breathtaking speed., 129 Over and over
again, opponents argued that prohibition effectively worsened the Depression be-
cause the vast profits of the illicit liquor and bootlegging industry escaped taxa-
tion. Some asserted that the national debt could would have been paid off prior to
the Depression if prohibition had not eliminated a major source of national reve-
nues. 3 References to the national debt harkened back to President Hoover's dog-
ged determination to raise taxes and curb governmental spending even as the econ-
omy's vigor eroded. The Prohibition Amendment's repeal raised the possibility
that the new source of governmental funds could ease the widespread economic
hardships. "The return of beer raised the often-expressed hope that repeal would
help solve the depression."'' When Americans voted for delegates to the ratifying
conventions, they voted overwhelmingly for the return of alcohol as well as the
return of a large source of federal funds.
Support for the Budget Amendment will likely correspond to its effect on the
national economy, individuals' well-being, and the effect on personal income tax
rates. Today's economic health invariably gives way to tomorrow's economic re-
cession.132 A limit on governmental borrowing power requires resort to the other
major source of federal funds -- income taxes -- at times when individuals and cor-
porations prove least able to pay. Concomitantly, governmental social programs
and projects that could alleviate economic difficulties must be reduced under Bud-
get Amendment constraints.
By contrast, repeal of the Budget Amendment would promise immediately
lower taxes and increased federal assistance. Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Se-
curity programs directly affect large numbers of voters. The prospect of individ-
ual relief and national economic improvement may secure the popular support nec-
128. VOSE, supra note 113, at 135.
129. NoRMANH.CLARi, DEuVERUsFROMEVIL: ANINIERPRErATIONOFAMERICANPROHBInON 208 (1976).
130. See generally KYViG, supra note 106, at 132. Moreover, the cost of governmental attempts to enforce
prohibition laws was estimated to exceed $300 million. Id.
131. Id. at 177. The impact ofeconomic considerations in the repeal of national prohibition should not be overstated.
The social aspect of the Great Experiment more than the economic aspect of the Great Depression led to repeal.
Nonetheless, support for prohibition collapsed simultaneously with the national economy.
132. "Since it was established 200 years ago, there have been seven periods in our history in which the national debt
more or less steadily increased, six when it declined, and three when it was stable. Of the seven periods of increase, six
were marked by either a major war or depression!' GORDON, supra note 9, at 174-75.
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essary for state referenda on convention delegates to ensure the repeal of the Bud-
get Amendment. In contrast to prohibition, which began as a social experiment
and ended as an unpopular, economic disaster, the quest to balance the federal
budget will begin as an economic measure that ends as an unpopular, social disas-
ter. To the extent that the Budget Amendment constrains federal borrowing powe-
r, the government's ability to affect and safeguard the economy will be curtailed.
Borrowing constraints' effects on the national social order will have profound ef-
fects on welfare benefits and entitlement programs. Basic national infrastructure
maintenance, natural disaster relief, regulatory protections, and public safety will
have to be reduced and shifted, at least in part, to the states.133 The loss of social
benefits will recast, to the degree that the Budget Amendment lives up to its pur-
pose, the federal government's relation to the American electorate. Supporters of
repeal may find that their most persuasive arguments center more on social justice
and the functioning of society as a whole than on economic contentions. An em-
phasis on the beneficial impact of repeal on voters themselves means that the con-
vention method, with its referendum function, is best suited for the ratification of
the Budget Repeal Amendment.
B. The Rule of Congressional Promulgation of Amendments
Irregularities in the ratification of a federal constitutional amendment occur
regularly. When ratification proceeds by state conventions, questions that Article
V fails to address abound. Even with the precedent of the Twenty-First Amend-
ment, the rules of the convention method remain unresolved. Congress's ability to
mandate the delegate election and convention proceeding details, and give incen-
tives for the ratification process remain unclear.'34 Conversely, the conventions'
independence from their state legislatures and courts also continues to pose unset-
tled issues.135 Control over the ratification process pits Congress against states in
vying to formulate the rules of ratification.
Article V's design ideally balances congressional and state amending powers
-- essentially making them co-equals for the purpose of federal constitutional
change. During the framing of the Constitution, the delegates expressed concerns
about attempts of Congress or the states to monopolize the amending process.
Hamilton argued that "[t]he State Legislatures will not apply for alterations but
133. In contrast, Madison's intended that the federal government to affect individuals directly. "In developing the
evils which viciate the political system of the U.S. it is proper to include those which are found within the states
individually, as well as those which affect the States collectively, since the former class have an indirect influence on
the general malady and must not be overlooked in forming a compleat remedy." JACK N. RAKOvE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLTCS AND IDEAS IN DIm MAKING oF um CoNs'InTrlIoN 47-48 (1996) (quoting James Madison's
memorandum prepared in anticipation of the federal convention of 1787).
134. This ranges from the subtle, offers to pay for the elections and conventions with the Twenty-First Amendment,
to the drastic, ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment as a precondition to readmission of a confederate state back
into the Union.
135. Compare In re Opinion of the Justices, 107 A. 673,675 (1919) (state high court advisory opinion) with Dyer
v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1303 (1975) (holding that states perform a "federal function" in ratifying an amendment
so that state constitutional provisions fail to apply to the ratifying body).
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with a view to increase their own powers ..... 136 The other delegates agreed and
voted to give Congress the same right to propose amendments as the states. More-
over, Congress's power to determine whether ratification proceed by state legisla-
tures or conventions further bolstered the federal government's ability to check
states' self-aggrandizement. Congress, however, also received suspect attention.
The original Virginia plan stated that "provision ought to be made for the amend-
ment of the Articles of the Union whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that the
assent of the National Legislature ought not to be required thereto." '137 Article V,
in its final form, drew criticism for ceding to much power in the amending process
to Congress. George Mason characterized Article V as "exceptionable & danger-
ous" because "the proposing of amendments is in both the modes to depend, in the
first immediately, and in the second, ultimately on Congress, no amendments of
the proper kind would ever be obtained by the people, if the Government should
become oppressive . '138 The response to this criticism was to give states the
final say in the ratification or rejection of every proposed amendment.139
As a matter of practice, Congress has appropriated the last word. Moreover,
the Supreme Court has affirmed Congress's practice of deciding whether and
when to declare an amendment to be ratified. The congressional practice of "pro-
mulgating" amendments began with the Fourteenth. For that Amendment, four
states presented problematic ratifications: two ratified after initially rejecting the
Amendment, and two attempted to rescind their earlier ratifications. Congress
counted each of these states toward ratification and declared the Fourteenth
Amendment to be part of the Constitution despite the ratifications' questionability.
Although the congressional announcement of constitutionality did not immediately
put the issue to rest, the passage of time caused lingering objections to recede into
acquiescence.1 40 De facto acceptance of the Fourteenth Amendment became de
jure legitimacy a half century later in Coleman v. Miller.141 In that case, the Court
summarily decided that long-standing acceptance of the Amendment after congres-
sional promulgation was conclusive upon the courts. 142 The Court also decided
that Congress's declaration of other amendments' validity would be conclusive in
the future. As a consequence, "[tjhe Coleman Court transformed the Reconstruc-
tion Congress' unprecedented action into a settled feature of article V, and con-
gressional promulgation has been the focal point of analysis of amendment process
issues ever since."'43
136. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 558.
137. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 22 (Section 13 of Virginia Plan); see also RAKoVF, supra note 129, at 91.
138. 2 FARRAND, RECORDs, at 629.
139. 2 FARRANDRREcORDs, at 558; see also TlEFDERALsTNo.85, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
140. See generally JosEPHB.JAms,TIERATICAaoNoFuimFouRTmEN AMnID,iENT 301,303 (1984).
141. 307 U.S. 433,448-50 (1939).
142. Id. The Court has a history of summarily affirming the legitimacy of amendments without much analysis or
discussion. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 378, 381-82 (1798) (first eleven Amendments).
143. Dellinger, supra note 44, at 397.
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Two consequences of Coleman have been to shift the balance of powers in
the amending process in favor of Congress and to allow for the constant shifting of
rules attending the amending process. Instead, the Court should have recognized
that "Article V establishes a balance between Congress and the states, and that
disputes as to the division of power should not be left to either. Instead, 'the
courts, as a neutral third party, and having the responsibility of 'guardian of the
Constitution" should resolve the disputes.""' The Supreme Court's abdication
from deciding amending process questions subjects the future amendments to shift-
ing rules that change with the composition of Congress, upon mere majority vote
of that institution. While it takes two thirds of Congress to propose an amend-
ment, a simple majority can vote to promulgate the amendment at the end of the
amending process. The outcome of the ratification process should not depend on
Congress, but on the verdict of three-quarters of the states.
VI. CONCLUSION
The proposal to amend the Constitution to require an annually balanced fed-
eral budget provides an excellent vehicle for examining the set of rules fashioned
by Congress and the courts in order to clarify amending process issues left unad-
dressed by Article V. The cumulative effect of these non-constitutional rules
seems to make the ratification of a Budget Amendment inevitable. Ironically,
these rules that have been created mainly by "congressional precedent" and Su-
preme Court abstention also make the Budget Amendment's subsequent repeal an
equally sure thing. Whatever the merits of the Budget Amendment,14 our Consti-
tution deserves better than to be altered due to a mishmash of technical rules that
have no textual basis in Article V. Instead, constitutional change represents our
most fundamental governmental reorganizations that must rest on the widespread
public approval if we continue to claim to be a democracy.
The amending process rules formulated by congressional, executive, and ju-
dicial officials now govern more fully than Article V itself. The Budget Amend-
ment's impending ratification and repeal offers an excellent vehicle for illustrating
each of these non-constitutional rules that nonetheless govern constitutional chang-
e. As the Framers were well aware that they left Article V in a woefully inade-
quate state to guide a nation through constitutional change. The Constitution fails
to answer fundamental questions about the workings of constitutional conventions,
announcing successful ratifications, counting or ignoring state ratifying actions,
144. 13AVRIGrErAL,FEDALPRArICEANDPROcEDURE§ 3534.1, at384 (1984) (quotingFreeman v. Idaho,
529 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Idaho 1981), vacated as moot sub. nom., NOW v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).
145. Despite using the Budget as a vehicle for examining the non-constitutional rules governing the amending
process, it lies beyond the scope of this Article to pronounce judgment on the amendment's merits. Excellent analyses
of the proposed amendment' s merit from a constitutional point of view have, however, been written. See, e.g., Laurence
Tribe, Issues Raised by Requesting Congress to Call a Constitutional Convention to Propose a Balanced Budget
Amendment, 10 PAC. LJ. 627 (1979).
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timing, and the role (if any) of federal judicial and executive officials in the
amending process.
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